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STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States 
provides 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
provides: 
Article I, section 14 of the Constitution of Utah 
[Unreasonable searches forbidden--Issuance of Sec. 14. 
warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or 
things to be seized. 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-10(2) provides: 
Force used in executing warrant -- Notice of authority 
prerequisite, when. 
When a search warrant has been issued 
authorizing entry into any building, room, conveyance, 
compartment or other enclosure, the officer executing the 
warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to 
enter: 
(2) Without notice of his authority and 
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the warrant directs in 
the warrant that the officer need not give notice. The 
magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, 
that the object of the search may be quickly disposed of, 
or secreted, or that physical harm may result to any 
person if notice were given. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE POLICE SHOULD NOT BE ACCORDED 
BLIND DEFERENCE WHEN DETERMINING WHETHER 
"NO-KNOCK" ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT 
IS APPROPRIATE. 
(Responding to Point I.A of Appellee's Brief) 
The State asks that the police be given almost unlimited 
deference in determining the best method of executing search 
warrants. This deference is unwarranted. The fourth amendment and 
article I, section 14 require that searches be reasonable. 
Implicit in such reasonableness is the understanding that excessive 
force will not be utilized in executing a search warrant. 
"Unquestionably, notice is ordinarily required as a prerequisite to 
the gaining of entry by physical force." 2 LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 4.8(b) at 273 (2d ed. 1987) (citing Miller v. United 
States, 357 U.S. 301, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958)). 
Citing the state constitutional right to bear arms, 
Article I, section 6, the State notes that "[t]he likelihood of 
violence upon an unconsented home entry, especially where criminal 
activity is already suspected, is therefore very real." Appellee's 
Brief at 10. Mr. Lee agrees. That's why we should knock rather 
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than break down someone's door. We knock so people are less 
alarmed, less likely to start shooting, and less likely to injure 
or kill people. See State v. Piller, 628 P. 2d 976 (Ariz. App. 
1981), where the court held it was not enough that officers knew 
that the defendant: 
had negotiated for the purchase of a .357 magnum handgun 
and that there was a possibility of such a weapon being 
in the residence. Police knowledge of existence of a 
firearm excuses compliance with announcement requirements 
only where the officers reasonably believe the weapon 
will be used against them if they proceed with the 
ordinary announcement, and this belief must be based on 
specific facts and not on broad, unsupported 
presumptions. 
Id. at 979. 
[T] he need for compliance with the knock-notice 
requirements is stronger where the police had knowledge 
of the presence of a weapon in the house and there is 
nothing to suggest that the occupants have a propensity 
to use the weapon against them, because there is more 
danger of a deadly encounter if the householder is 
startled by an unexpected intruder. 
Id. Fundamental constitutional rights, rather than the "'self-
destructive officer' premise" asserted by the State, are the bases 
of the holdings by the courts in Piller and People v. Dumas, 512 
P.2d 1208, 1213 (Cal. 1973). The police are understandably more 
concerned for their own safety than they are for the rights of 
others to safety and to be free from unreasonable searches. If 
police safety was the only relevant concern, the police could argue 
that it is preferable to kill the persons subject to search 
warrants and thereby conduct searches in complete safety. We must 
also concern ourselves with the safety of the subjects of searches, 
and also the safety of innocent bystanders who may be located in or 
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near the premises. Fortunately, this country has an independent 
judiciary to protect the constitutional rights of all its citizens, 
and prevent imposition of a police state. 
The police are seeking to use no-knock warrants more and 
more frequently. See, e.g. State v. Thurman, 2 03 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 
(Utah 1993) (police sought no-knock, day or night authorization; 
magistrate only authorized daytime, knock and announce execution; 
police executed warrant in no-knock manner anyway). Television is 
replete with show after show where the police break down the door 
to "get the bad guys." People are getting injured and killed. 
Courts should be wary of creating a per se rule allowing no-knock 
warrants in drug cases.1 The trial court in this case was 
justifiably concerned that such a rule is not far off when he asked 
the prosecutor: 
THE COURT: Is it your position that in any 
drug search -- well, maybe that's going too far. But in 
almost every drug search, the evidence is rather small 
and easily concealed or disposed of. Are you saying that 
in any of those that a no-knock is justified? 
R. 141, lines 13-18. 
The Supreme Court has recently set forth the purpose of 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10:2 
igee, e.g., Appellee's Brief at 12: "A home that is to be 
entered pursuant to a probable cause finding is presumptively 
'hostile.' Therefore, even uncertain evidence that the occupants 
were armed formed a sufficient basis to authorize searching 
officers to take precautions. 
2Although in Thurman, no-knock entry was not authorized, the 
evils that the knock-and-announce rule seeks to avoid are amply 
demonstrated. In this case, there was no compelling need to 
execute the warrant on a no-knock basis, and no-knock authorization 
should have been denied. 
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The Utah knock-and-announce statute obviously 
anticipates that the occupant of the target residence 
will have the opportunity to answer the door, thus 
maintaining some control over his or her abode and 
keeping the encounter with the police on a civil basis. 
Nothing in the facts suggests that if the agents had 
complied with the statute, Thurman would not have 
awakened, dressed, and answered the door. Rather than 
allowing Thurman to retain some control over the 
encounter, six agents burst into his small apartment with 
weapons drawn, routed him out of bed, handcuffed him 
behind the back while he was naked (somehow producing a 
bloody nose in the process), and commenced the search. 
Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26-7 (cite omitted) . Before the 
judiciary should blindly follow what the police in their discretion 
believe to be the best course, the police should prove that they 
are worthy of such deference. Cases such as Thurman show that the 
police are not worthy of the degree of deference the State now 
seeks. 
At page 9 of its brief, the State cites Dalia v. United 
States, 441 U.S. 238, 257, 99 S.Ct. 1682, 1693, 60 L.Ed.2d 177, 192 
(1979) for its statement that "it is generally left to the 
discretion of the executing officers to determine the details of 
how best to proceed with the performance of a search authorized by 
warrant -- subject of course to the general Fourth Amendment 
protection 'against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" The 
dissent in Dalia is also worthy of scrutiny: 
"It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest 
and least repulsive form: but illegitimate and 
unconstitutional practices get their first footing in 
that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight 
deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only 
be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional 
provisions for the security of person and property should 
be liberally construed. A close and literal construction 
deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to 
gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted 
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more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of 
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of 
the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments 
thereon." 
Id. , 441 U.S. at 262, 99 S.Ct. at , 60 L.Ed.2d at 195-6 (quoting 
Bovd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 
(1886) . The constitutional right to be free from having one's door 
broken down currently exists "more in sound than in substance." 
POINT II. PERSONS SUSPECTED OF DRUG DEALING 
UPON A PROBABLE CAUSE FINDING RETAIN THE 
SAME SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROTECTIONS AS DO 
ORDINARY CITIZENS. 
(Responding to Point I.B. of Appellee's Brief) 
The United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution 
apply to all the citizens of Utah equally. A person does not check 
his or her constitutional rights at the door merely because he or 
she has been accused or is suspected of some criminal conduct. The 
State cites no authority to the contrary. Merely because there has 
been a finding of probable cause does not mean that the suspect has 
no right to be free from unannounced entry. The Utah legislature 
has required that a particularized showing of necessity be made 
before an unannounced entry is authorized by enacting Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-23-10(2). Mr. Lee argues that the Fourth Amendment and 
Article I, section 14 require no less. See Appellant's Brief at 
17-19. Cf. State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 21 (Utah 1993) 
(declining to decide whether violation of the Utah knock and 
announce statute is also a violation of the fourth amendment) . The 
State is arguing for something akin to a per se rule. 
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State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991) is 
inapposite. The State correctly notes that citizens have no right 
to forcibly resist even an unlawful search, but nobody has alleged 
that there was any resistance here. The question here is not 
whether there is a right to resist; the question at issue is 
whether the police may break down the door unannounced. Excessive 
force utilized in the execution of a search warrant renders the 
search unreasonable. State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 703 (Utah 1988) 
(manner of entry would be unreasonable if it "contribute[d] 
appreciably to the invasion of privacy"). The exclusionary rule 
renders the evidence seized inadmissible. 
POINT III. VIOLATION OF THE "NO-KNOCK" 
STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-10(2), 
REQUIRES THAT THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED BE 
EXCLUDED. 
(Responding to Point I.C. of Appellee's Brief) 
The state assails Mr. Lee's reference to State v. Rowe, 
806 P.2d 730 (Utah App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 196 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah, September 28, 1992) in support of the 
proposition that violation of the "no-knock" statute requires 
exclusion of the evidence obtained. Rather than being a mere 
"nominal allusion," Appellee's Brief at 15, Mr. Lee has fully set 
forth the basis of his position. 
The state asserts that Rowe was overruled on precisely 
the point for which it was cited by Mr. Lee. This is not so. 
Although counsel did not carefully set forth the refinements the 
Supreme Court put on the Court of Appeal's decision in Rowe, the 
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proposition of law as stated is correct. The Court of Appeals in 
Rowe held that violation of a statute establishing procedures for 
protecting substantive rights requires suppression. The Court of 
Appeals also noted that "mere ministerial and technical errors in 
the preparation or execution of search warrants will not, without 
more, invalidate the warrant." Id. at 738 (citing State v. Buck, 
756 P. 2d 700, 702-3 (Utah 1988) (violation of "knock-and-announce" 
rule did not require suppression when no one was at home at the 
time of the search to respond to the knock)). In overruling, the 
Supreme Court focused on the facts, not the Court of Appeals 
statement of the law. The Supreme Court restated the law as 
follows: 
"Only a 'fundamental violation of [a rule of 
criminal procedure] requires automatic suppression, and 
a violation is 'fundamental' only where it, in effect, 
renders the search unconstitutional under traditional 
fourth amendment standards. Where the alleged violation 
. . . is not 'fundamental' suppression is required only 
where: (1) there was 'prejudice' in the sense that the 
search might not have occurred or would not have been so 
abrasive if the [r]ule had been followed, or (2) there 
is evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard of a 
provision of the [r]ule. . . . 
It is only where the violation also 
implicates fundamental, constitutional concerns, is 
conducted in bad-faith or has substantially prejudiced 
the defendant that exclusion may be an appropriate 
remedy. 
Rowe, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15 (quoting State v. Fixei, 744 P.2d 
1366, 1369 (Utah 1987)). 
The Supreme Court next addressed the critical facts that 
were determinative. "Defendant has not argued that there were no 
substantive grounds for a nighttime, no-knock warrant. She merely 
argues that the affidavit supporting the application for a warrant 
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Jdileij ;" i " lint l.l lose grounds . . . " K-iW'. I "u Utah Adv. Rep. at 
15, Additionally, the police had a valid arrest, warrant for one of 
t h.p occupants that authorized no-knock, ni ghttime entry. "Inasmuch 
as the off icers made lawful ei iti > c: i ito tl le pi emi ses an :i had genera] 
authority to secure those premises plus a vali d warrant to search 
t- |ie premii spf d/t lrd ng the dayl ight, the :i mproperly authorized 
execution of that search during the night ti n ie cc i isti tutes a i 1: i i i ] :i n ia] 
intrusion on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment " Id. at 
J b- Lb . ""Tlit • magi strate' s er roi leoi is approval of n ight time search 
M ;v. rarity r ui : r.e] h,/i >- w^-. ur,L" .* ^  ac i-v>^  criicers tu. . J .-. 
rrgnufu] Iv ^V^en steps *  ' p°nire t.he hous^ pursuant. " t u- a\ i c^ ^' 
warran : ~- ;
 a - search LIIC 
house . r. \ he tay.ight rnj\:i ^ . ' Rowef .^ '".-it ^ J V . ;—p. a^ 1& 
Under thes - r=-:—? the Supreme Cour* t that 
suppression was not . • . . The KupieiTio Ojuit 
exception, to the standard as articulated by the Court ..u .ppea~s, 
1
 a * • - • •'- s * it undei * h^ ""a 'Lb oi Rowfe any violat ion t hat 
occurred was mere.y techu,:--;^. nature -. .1 Iti h, I ^di h m 1 
suppression. 
In I he present: rase I lie, Lee actively asserts that, there 
were no sufficient substantive grounds toi a no-knock v 'aiianl , 
Absen1" suor -^'ounds, the force used :n cixecut. ing the warrant was 
ex-.roi - .* . • '"*t"f •- unaei the r* ah arei United 
States constitutions .oiai.ioi. . - "n n - Knock" statute was 
"fundamental," and t ^ -v;n^t'~ seized .-uioulc he suppressed. As 
applied to t-he fat: .- . v : ' -:;•: - * • • • *:e 
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court in Rowe mandates the same 
result: the evidence seized must be suppressed. 
POINT IV. THE OFFICERS' LACK OF GOOD FAITH IS 
CLEAR FROM THE RECORD CURRENTLY BEFORE 
THIS COURT, AND NO REMAND TO DETERMINE 
POSSIBLE GOOD FAITH IS NECESSARY. 
(Responding to Point I.D. of Appellee's Brief) 
The state failed to raise the federal "good faith 
exception" below, and has therefore waived its right to assert its 
applicability. Cf. State v. Marshall, 791 P. 2d 880, 885 (Utah 
App.) (state may not raise the issue of standing for the first time 
on appeal), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). Mr. Lee 
briefed the issue to ensure that this Court did not sua sponte rely 
on the federal "good faith exception" to uphold the validity of the 
search in this case. The state should be precluded from making 
such arguments now. 
At page 16 of Appellee's Brief, the state argues that 
should this Court determine that the search pursuant to the warrant 
was invalid, this matter should be remanded for a determination of 
possible good faith. As fully set forth in Appellant's Brief in 
Point I.B. at pp. 19-23, the good faith exception does not apply in 
this case. "Officer Bassi, as affiant, detainer of Dowell, and 
executor of the warrant, had knowledge at the time of execution 
that Dowell was in custody." Lack of good faith is apparent on the 
record, and remand would only serve to waste additional judicial 
resources. 
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affidavit: or otherwise) what those facts are and what they wouJd 
shoi ; "Whi 1 e the state' s deci sion not Lo develop this issue at-
trial is understandable i n 1 ight '-I the state's succes, lln-jtr 
h-- -•* ate she u Id have raised the argument ir. . n:i. a; 
• . :. - * T .-M • : * v -  -\ ' -. . ; i d i i - b/; ~'L- -.•cs": *: ' or r a d 
rner L •. . •' S t a t e v . S a m p s o n , c•.. t i- .,..;
 4 ..'. 1 1 1 ~ ; t a.. Ap* ^ .-;- -,J , 
cert. denied "-• '• y . ? - . * :: and cert, denied, 
s:a:e'F failure brief this issue despite L.ee ;-; : ., . 
b r i e t m g of • rv? natter'- . the record her^ ' c- w;--e than adequate ann 
show? 1-he c.; : , :eis . ; --
should have argued trie Legal merits whether a gc,, ; : h : ' . 
--*.---rr '• . --,<: ' ••;:; ":^ i Liie .-:>.*-? "onsiitution, s_e^ runiL 
I.E., ;. Appe- idiit ' s ;.r . •. : a*- pp . . remand I P necessary to 
develop a record :::. g:•_.-.: raith. 
POINT V. UTAH APPELLATE COURTS HAVE NOT YET 
APPLIED THE "TOTALITY OF THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES" TEST TO SEARCH WARRANTS 
UNDER ARTICLE I SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
(Responding to Point III of Appellee's Brief 
at p. 23 n.7) 
3Perhaps the state's i eluctance to bri ef this :i ssi ie i s i I : • t 
unrelated to the merits of its argument. 
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The state cites State v. Miller. 740 P.2d 1363, 1365 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987) as an example 
of a situation where this Court has applied the "totality of the 
circumstances test" to search warrants under Article I section 14 
of the Utah constitution. The state mis-reads Miller. The opinion 
states !l[t]he fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
and article one, section fourteen of the Utah Constitution both 
require a finding of 'probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation' prior to issuance of a search warrant." Id. at 1365. 
The opinion then discusses the federal test under Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). At no 
point does the Miller opinion address the appropriate test to 
determine whether an affidavit establishes probable cause under the 
state constitution, or address separate state constitutional 
arguments on any issue. The reference to article I section 14 thus 
appears to be gratuitous. This Court has implicitly recognized 
that Miller was not decided under the state constitution in State 
v. Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1109 and n.2 (Utah App. 1988), cert, 
denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989), and State v. Dronebura, 781 P.2d 
1303, 1304 and n.l (Utah App. 1989).4 
4As in Miller, both Dronebura and Ayala mention section 14 in 
conjunction with the fourth amendment, but fail to address whether 
the state constitutional standard is different because the matter 
was not briefed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mi: Lee respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
trial couit s uiaei ut*~v:^ ;n M s motion Lu .".uppres.? ^he -^ider^e 
obtained -* ^  t-*^  seal .. ^ ; ^ premises • ;• .  : ;.•_ -.^ ,JL. ; e^t- i 
Evidence seiz-'i frcrr t v:e search of Mi: Lie*- sh-:\.id be suppressed a?. 
I i t i it i '» J 
SUBMITTED t:.:s j£g__ day^of March 1993 . 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appe11ant 
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